

«STORMING OF AMIN'S PALACE» (OPERATION «STORM-333»)**Umurbaev Rustam Shakirjanovich***4th-year student of Tashkent State University of Oriental Studies**Tashkent city urustam316@gmail.com +998946995982*

Abstract: *The article is clearly tendentious and embarrassing. The author either does not own the topic or deliberately distorts and holds back the facts. More than 30 years have passed since those events and all materials have been declassified for a long time. The 103rd Vitebsk Airborne Forces began landing at the Kabul airfield on the evening of December 25, 1979. Although, in Soviet times, it was officially announced that Soviet troops were introduced on January 1, 1980.*

Key words: *Washington, Afghanistan, healthy, military preferred, deliberately.*

INTRODUCTION

On December 27, 1979, the division advanced to Kabul and seized and blocked all more or less important state and military facilities, as well as military units stationed in Kabul. Thus, ensuring the Storm 333 success to a certain extent. Moreover, the commander of the 103rd Airborne Forces, General Ivan Ryabchenko, personally Andropov and Ustinov, was tasked with neutralizing the second person in Afghanistan, the chief of the General Staff of Yakub, brother-in-law Amin, who really could give an order to the Afghan Army for armed resistance. Ryabchenko and the division's officers, while in the office of Yakub at the time of the explosion of the communications well, which served as the beginning of the operation, physically did not allow him to do this. Although the telephone connection was interrupted, there was a working and switched on radio station in Yakub's office. The third battalion of the 350th Guards. RAP without any specialists, independently stormed the complex of the General Staff of the Afghan army. The second most important facility in Kabul.

Material and Methods

The author of the article either unknowingly or deliberately keep silent about all this. However, do not forget to indicate 345 OPDP. The situation could be called like this: «But the elephant was not noticed...». Two companies took part in those events in Kabul from the 345th, the main part of 345 carried out an operation rather unsuccessfully at the Bagram airfield. But a whole division, they prefer not notice. Although, the 103rd Airborne Division, the only airborne division in the Union, for its skillful actions during the operation STORM 333 in 1980 was awarded the highest order of the USSR - the Order of Lenin! Apparently, deleting from the history of the actions of 103 Guards. VDD, the authors want to bring more glory to the specialists and the heroic 345th OPDP. Only real heroes do not need inflated glory. History will put everything in its place anyway. I ask our brothers (normal ones, with many of whom we were in the same training) from the 345th OPDP not to take offense and not consider my comment as an attempt to somehow belittle your merits. But, deleting

103 VDD from the history, some of your figures are likening to the well-known saying «Well done, among the sheep»! Near the 103rd Airborne Division, this is not very successful. Although Amin had been begging for Soviet troops to support his regime, from the Kremlin's point of view he was the main problem: his brutal purges of the PDPA were wiping out the cadres needed to maintain the regime and hollowing out the military, his heavy-handed and counter-productive modernization campaign was setting the country ablaze, and his overtures to Washington raised the prospect of Afghanistan changing its allegiance.

RESULTS

Ultimately, though, their belief was that the PDPA was fundamentally healthy and that a more moderate and conciliatory leader and a more Sensitive and gradualist policy would be able to turn things around. The Goals of the intervention were thus three: to remove Amin and replace him with Parcham's Babrak Karmal; to seize the country rapidly enough that the DRA's military would not be forced to choose between resistance and surrender, so that it could be preserved to fight the mujahideen; and to make a quick, convincing show of force to cow the rebellion. From the first, this was a strategy based on dubious assumptions and a Great deal of over-optimism. The military High Command was very unhappy at the idea, not least feeling that the proposed deployment of 75.000-80.000 troops was too many for a surgical strike, too few for a comprehensive pacification of the country. This was in many ways a clumsy compromise from the 35.000-40.000 the KGB thought would be enough (this had been Kirpichenko's estimate) and the kind of overwhelming force the military preferred. It was, after all, proportionately smaller in terms of the ratio of troops to area or troops to population than the eventual - and unsuccessful so, we must simply forget about it (U.S. Force in Vietnam). It was also only a fraction of the quarter of a million troops used in 1968 to crush the liberal «Prague Spring», despite the fact that Czechoslovakia was much more politically and geographically propitious for such an operation. Nonetheless, this was a political decision, and preparations began on 10th December, 1979. Ustinov gave Ogarkov verbal orders to set up a new Combined Arms Army in TurkVO (the Turkistan Military District, which bordered Afghanistan), and to prepare an airborne division, an independent airborne regiment, and five Military Transport Aviation divisions for an airlift, while two divisions in the TurkVO were to be brought to combat readiness and reinforced with a pontoon bridge regiment from the Kyiv Military District.

DISCUSSION

In theory, the Soviets were developing plans to protect Amin. In practice, Kolesnik already had a good sense that things were heading in a different direction and prepared accordingly. First of all, he put a much greater emphasis on quickly gathering detailed intelligence of the target, especially as the initial plan had been based on Amin being resident at the Arg but, as will be discussed below, on 16th December, 1979, he decided to move to the Tajbeg Palace, instead. A whole variety of opportunities were taken to reconnoitre target locations and test the readiness and posture of the guards.

Polyakov's team had also been in-country for months and had compiled extensive files which provided Kolesnik's team an invaluable basis for their planning. When Amin decided to move his residence to the Tajbeg Palace, this effort went into high gear. Oleg Balashov, one of the Grom's section commanders, played the role of a Soviet diplomatic bodyguard to accompany several delegations to the Tajbeg Palace, for example. Most enterprisingly, on seeing that a nearby hotel's restaurant had an excellent panoramic view of the palace grounds, Zenit's Major Semyonov and his Grom counterpart, Major Romanov, along with two Grom operators, visited the day before the operation and took detailed pictures. They were subsequently stopped from returning to their barracks by a DRA security patrol and questioned, but they were able to convince them that they had simply been considering it as a venue for a New Year's Eve party. The real trump card, though, was that while Amin's personal security team was recruited from his relatives and closest supporters, they were provided with technical support by a team from the KGB's 9th Directorate, the unit which provided security for Party officials and key Soviet government buildings.

CONCLUSION

A typical view, in this case from an online magazine for fans of Russian military history, is that it was an operation «unparalleled in the history of the world's special services» and «one of the brightest pages in the history of the KUOS». Indeed, although these are absent from professional studies and more serious histories, the notion that Amin was a CIA agent has become orthodoxy for many.

Acknowledgement

«Storm-333» is still being interpreted and reinterpreted by Russians today to learn lessons, but also make points. The Soviet war in Afghanistan is a painful and difficult historical experience for today's Russia, after all. On the one hand, it can claim not to have anything to do with the actions of a different regime, of a different state. That this was a Soviet blunder, not a Russian one. On the other, Vladimir Putin has clearly embarked on an attempt to cherry-pick the elements of Soviet and even Tsarist history that best fit his message that Russia is a country with unique strengths and a singular global mission. The Soviets did not really lose the Afghan War: they could have continued to sustain their commitment there, but withdrew because reformist leader Mikhail Gorbachev saw no advantage in doing so and a clear political gain from leaving. However, they certainly failed to win it. No amount of spin can change this, so instead the focus has shifted to specific elements of the war that do fit Putin's patriotic message more neatly. «Storm-333» is clearly one such episode, able to be presented as a relatively neat surgical strike, a daring blow by a handful of Soviet commandos, a triumph of both planning and battlefield skills. As a result, there is a plethora of books and articles about the operation, which in fairness do not omit the tragedies and the blunders, but certainly emphasize the drama and the victory.

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